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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON PIPE
COMPANY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

.and
ALVIN T. LOCKE,
Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

No. 8336

HARSH UTAH CORPORATION, a corporation, HARSH INVI~STMENT CORPORATION, a corporation, and HAROLD
J. SCHNITZER, an individual,
Defendants and Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION :F,OR REHEARING
Alvin T. Locke, intervening plaintiff and respondent
herein, petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing
and re-argument in the above entitled case. The petition
is based upon the following grounds:
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POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE CONTRACT
OF OCTOBER 4th, 1951, AS CONTEMPLATING RECEIPTS
FROM MORTGAGE BORROWING RATHER THAN THE
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT - "LUMP SUM" PRICE AS
THE SOURCE OF REVENUE IN COMPUTING PROFITS
EARNED IN CONNE~CTION WITH THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE PROJECT.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NET RENTAL
INCOME DURING THE CONSTRUCTION PERIOD IS NOT
TO BE INCLUDED AS REVENUE IN COMPUTING PROFITS
EARNED IN 'CONNECTION WITH THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE PROJECT.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER POINT
I OF RESPONDENT'S CROSS APPEAL AND IN FAILING
TO HOLD THAT THE AMOUNT OF REVENUE FOR THE
CHANGE ORDER EXTRAS WAS $333,952.55 INSTEAD OF
$178,672.00.

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER POINT
II OF RESPONDENT'S ·CROSS APPEAL AND IN FAILING
TO HOLD THAT APPELLANTS MAY NOT RECEIVE OUT
OF CONSTRUCTION PROFITS TEN PERCENT (10o/0 ) OF
THE AMOUNT OF THE BID BEFORE COMPUTING RESPONDENT'S BONUS.

'VIIEREFORE, the respondent, petitioner herein,
prays that the judgment and opinion of the court be reexamined and a re-argument permirtted of the entire case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith.
JOHN M. SHERMAN
and
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
By PAUL THATCHER
Attorneys for Petitioner
PAUL THATCHER, hereby certifies that he is one
of the aJttorneys for the respondent, petitioner herein, and
that in his opinion there is good cause to believe that the
opinion is erroneous on the grounds set forth in the following brief and that the case ought to be re-examined
and re-argued as prayed for in said petition.
DATED this 13th d:ay of September, 1956.
pAUL THATCHER

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING
ARGU1IENT
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
In its opinion filed herein this Court observes that
it has a great deal of sympathy for the trial court which
was required to wade through a morass of per jury and
claimed embezzlement, accus·ations and counter accusations .and recriminations. Certainly this Court deserves
no less sympathy, as the plain duty of e~ach member requires that he also wade through the same morass which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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is now congealed into a cold record, unwanned and unilluminated by the personalities and manner of the ~ev
eral p.arties and witnesses which served to highlight and
clarify not only the trial but the evidence and the relationships of the parties. Nevertheless the members of
this Court cannot, under their oruths as judges, escape
that duty.
~

.~,

The Court will appreciate, we are sure, that ordinarily Respondent would not ask the Court to reconsider ,
an opinion re:ached by four of its members. However,
this ease has, if only because of the criminal activities
of the defendant Schnitzer and his purchased henchman,
become something of a "cattse celebre" in the Far West,
and not only justice, but Utah's reputation for justice
and fair dealing is involved. Moreover, the amounts

1

invohlveRd are nodt in)conTsihderRable ordunimport~ntd~ att lebasdt '
e espon ent a so IS IS ur e 4
to t e espon enrt .
by the failure of the 1najority of this Court even to consider, discuss or dispose of the two points

e~arnestly

raised by his Cross Appeal, a favorable ruling on either
of which would have required the aw.arding some bonus
to appellant Locke. Finally the Court's opinion (evidently on the theory that one 1nay "give a dog a bad name
and hang him") gratuitously characterizes Respondent t
Locke as a ''deep reacher" .and as "probably the party
with influence," - i.e., a "five percenter" - without anything in the record to support such slurs, whereas the
record shows that Locke throughout acted with complete
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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honesty and integrity, both as to Schnitzer and the subcontractors. No honorable man should be expected to
"stand still" under such circumsrtances.
It would seem further that, in view of the difficult
condition of the record, more weight really should have
been given to the findings .and determination of the
learned trial judge, who is generally recognized as one
of the most respected, learned, prutient, careful, conscientious and diligent judge's in the Sta:te, with some
20 years of judicial experience behind him.

These considerations, with an abiding conviction that
the majority of this Court inadvertently fell into grave
error and did gr.ave injustice because of a misunderstanding of the facts, the situation of the contra0ting parties,
and the law and procedures relaJting to Wherry Housing
projects impel Respondent to file this petition and brief.
Under the circumstances it is felt thak our duty to the
Court as well as to the Respondent would permit no less.

POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE CONTRACT
OF OCTOBER 4th, 1951, AS CONTEMPLATING RECEIPTS
FROM MORTGAGE BORROWING RATHER THAN THE
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT - "LUMP SUM" PRICE AS
THE SOURCE OF REVENUE IN COMPUTING PROFITS
EARNED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE PROJECT.
A

At the outset Respondent is c;ompelled to point out
that the opinion of the majority of the Court is very
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apparently based upon a completely erroneous misconception of a basic f:act. On page 2, and again on page 8
of the opinion it is said that the agreement of 00tober
4, 1951, was prepared by Locke's Attorney, and the Court
accordingly construes it 1nost strictly against Locke.
This is not the fact, and the record so shows.
The evidence on this point is to be found on page
52, of the transcript, and is as follows :
"QUESTION BY MR. SHERMAN
ANSWER BY liAROLD J. SCHNITZER
"Q.

Isn't it a fact, Mr. Schnitzer, that that particular contract dated Ooto ber 4, 1951 was
prepared by :Mr. Frank L. Whitaker'

A.

No. I beg your pardon. It was prepared by
Mr. Schnitzer (Louis Schnitzer, attorney)
with Mr. Whitaker in conference, but the
form was prepared by Mr. Schnitzer, and the
final agreement was prepared by Mr. Schnitzer.

Well then, other than the preparation of the
document itself by your cousin, JJ1 r. Louis
Schnitzer, was it at any tilne formally
brought to the attention of the board of directors as such of Harsh Investment Corporation'
A. Harsh Investlnent Corporation has never, to
my knowledge, ever had .a formal meeting
for the particular purpose of c.onsidering the
October 4 oonrtract with Locke.
Q.

Q.

Then the only discussion of it then was between yourself as director and Louis Schnitzer as a director at or about the time that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the contract itself was prepared. I~s that
correct~

A.

That's correct."

It is clear-absolutely clear-tha,t the contracl was
prepared not by Locke's aJttorney, but by Louis Schnitzer,
Harold J. Schnitzer's cousin, man, and henchman, who
even went so far as t1o aid ~and counsel with defendant
Schnitzer by phone concerning Schnitzer's plans to commit perjury in this case, as the record shows (Tr. 10241026), and Locke had no more than perfunctory legal
counsel from :Mr. Whitaker in this regard-and Whitaker
later turned up as one of Schnitzer's Portland attorneys.
These (contrary to the statements in the opinion)
being the facts, it is the universal and familiar rule that
the agreement of October 4, 1951, as well as all previous
agreements which were prepared by Schnitzer himself,
must be strictly construed against Schnitzer and his corporation, and libe~rally construed in favor of Locke.
17 C. J. S., "Contracts," Section 324, p. 751, states

the general rule as follows:
"To the extent that a contraCit is susceptible
to two constructions by reason of doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of ambiguous language, it is to be construed most strongly or
strictly against the party by whom, or in whose
behalf, the contract was prepared or the ambiguous language was used and liberally and most
strongly in favor of the party who is not the
author and not responsible for the use of the lanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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guage giving rise to the doubt and nnePrtaint~·."
Read v. Forced Underfiring Corp., 82 U. 529, 26
P. 2d, 325;

Jordon v. Mads en, 69 U. 112, 252 P. 570 ~
Penn Star Mining Co. v. Lyntan, 64 U. 343, 231
P. 107;
General Mills v. Cragun, 103 U. 239, 134 P. 2d
1089;
Gregerson v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 256 P.
566 (Utah, 1953).

~<l

It is obvious that the Court~ 1nisled by a misapprehens~on of the true fact as to the draftmanship of the
agree·ment, followed exactly the contrary rule, construed
the contraet strietly against Locke, as the supposed
draftsman, and so fell into error.
In this connection we are also constrained to call
to the Court's attention the well e·stablished rule of law
that where a 'trial court, after hearing all the evidence
and considering the weight thereof and the demeanor
of the witnesses, has entered a judgment, every presumption is indulged in favor of the correctness of the
judgmenrt, and i~t will he presumed that the Court found
the facts which will support the judgment if there is any
evidence in the reeord which would support or justify
such a finding if made.

Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Company, 3 1~.
247, 282 P. 2d 335;
llifcCall'IJ;nt v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P. 2d 468.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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B

Let us turn now to the core of this controversy;
the construction of the agreement of Octo her 4, 1951. As
the Court in its opinion very properly observed, thre
basic disagreement between the parties goes to the
measurement of construction profit, and, more specifieallv
. ' what construct~on income was contemplated and
intended by them to be used as the basis for computing
such profits, or (even more specifically) whe1ther the
parties really intended that for such purpose the money
borrowed by the Owner from Irving Trust Company
should be deemed the only n1oney "earned" in connection with the construction, or whether they intended that
the agreed contract price to be paid under the construction contraci - "lump sum" as supplemented by
the "Change Orders" for extra work should be deemed
to be the money "earned" in connection with the construction.
The learned trial judge after hearing many days
of testimony and argument, and after patient, careful
and conscientious consideration, properly construed the
contract and found that the parties intended the contract
price under the construction contract should be the basis

for computing construction profits earned. This Court,
erroneously construing the contract strictly against
Locke, concluded that the parties intended that the money
borrowed was intended to be the sole earnings for com-

puting construction profit.
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In this case the evidence is clear that Schnitzer and
his Attorney drew the October 4th agreement, and the
trial court obviously and properly proceeded on that
basis to construe the contract strictly against him and
liber.ally for Locke. Accordingly this Court should not
upset the trial court's findings and conclusions unles·s
they are clearly contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence or the law, which is certainly not the case here.
See Respondent's brief, page 100, and cases there cited.
See also:

Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P. 2d 513;
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 U. 520, 94 P. 2d 465;
Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Urtah 475, 214 P. 313;
Jenkins v. Nicolas, 63 Utah 329, 226 P. 177;
Bennett v. Bowen, 65 Ut·ah 444, 238 P. 240.
Although the Oourt's opinion in several places refers to the "plain, unmnbiguous terms of the contract,"
it is abundantly clear that the contract is neither plain
nor unambiguous in this reg;ard. In the first place not
only did Respondent and his counsel, but also the learned
Chief Justice and the learned trial judge have ooncluded
that the n1e1aning of the contract is contrary to that assigned by the majority. In -the second place, even the
majority have found it necess:ary in their opinion to rely
(mistakenly as has been shown) upon the asrsumed f~act
that Locke's attorney drew the document, and also upon
the background and previous dealings of the parties in
order to arrive at a conclusion as to meaning and intent.
(And here again the majority nlisapprehended the nature and significance of such background and dealings.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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And in the third place, the contract provides for payment
of a bonus to Locke based on "profit earned by Harsh
in connection with" construction, without supplying any
defin~tion of the difficult and broad term "profit" nor
any definition of or formula for computing or establishing the basic components of any profit. Considering that
by October 4, 1951, both partie1s had acquired a thorough
knowledge of the requirements and procedures for this
Wherry project, and of the various possible sources of
both income and expense which each of the several corporations and persons necessarily involved would have,
it is clear that the words used in this situation are most
1tnclear-and muslt be construed strictly against Schnitzer, and any doubts as to meaning resolved ag.ainst him,
as he and his attorney drew the docmnent and foisted it
off on Locke, the builder. It must be remembered too
thak Schnitzer was a millionaire financier, accustomed
to problems of income, expense, profit and loss, and
juggling of profits and funds to s:ave taxes, while Locke
was a builder, ·without riches, and unaccustomed to the
fast foot-work which was Schnitzer's way-of-life in these
matters. All tlris must be inferred and assmned in support of the lower court's judgment, in accord with the
principles referred to above.
B.l)

Actually, the contraet itself is so inartificially drawn
that it gives few clues as to speeific meaning on the points
in issue. Considering the brilliant intellectual ability
of Schni tzer, which was apparent to all who participated
1
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in the trial below, and the character (or rather, lark
of it) of Schnitzer and of his henchmen and feudal
retainers, as that was developed and disclosed at the
trial-considering all this in the light of the fact that
Schnitzer and his cousin-,attorney carefully prepared the
document, the Court would be entirely justified in inferring that Schnitzer intended the contract as a bated hook
on which to crutch the unwary Locke, playing him if
necessary through financially exhausting litigation to
the shallows of bankruptcy where Loeke could be forced
to capitulate and leave Schnitze,r the sole owner of a
prope,rty costing Schnitzer nothing, but worth millions.
However, the contract does present, within its four
corners, several cogent clues as to the intention of the
parties.
First, the contract provides a bonus to be paid out
of "net profit earned by Harsh in connection with the
construction of the .aforesaid projects." The term used
is "earned". Earnings come either from pay for services
rendered or from buying low and selling high. It is in
the very nature of things-it is inherent in the Ine·aning
and concept of the term-that earnings, or earned profit,
cannot arise in any other way. Now, money borrowed
is not, and never can be, money earned. vV e repeat:
money borrowed can never be money earned. The meanings of the two words, the fundamental concepts expressed by e,ach, are totally and absolutely different.
We challenge the Court to find one dictionary, or even
one man on the street, who will say that money borrowed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is the same as rnoney earned. The·se are no·t mere technical niceties of accounting terminology; they .are fundamental to the accepted meaning of the English language
and to the facts of business life.
We are sure thwt no lawyer, and no judge who has
ever been compelled to borrow money has ever, for tax
purposes, reported the money received either as "earned
income" or as "e:arned profit." We are equally sure
thaJt if any busy income tax agent had ever suggested
that the money received on the loan was "e·arned profit"
and taxable as such, the outraged protests of that lawyer,
and of that judge, would still be echoing in the judicial
halls. :Money borrowed is not money earned!
Axiomatically, earned profit can come ONLY out of
earned money, and not out of borrowed money. No
matter how ignorant this millionaire and his attorney
were on October 4th, 1951, they knew that much! And
knowing that much, they chose to promise Locke a bonus
out of "profits earned." They knew bertter than to use
"earned" for "borrowed." Clearly they contemplated
and intended some legal arrangement by which Harsh
Investment Corporation would earn money, and probably
even earn a money profit in connection with the construction of the project. This necessarily and absolutely
negatives .any purpose or intent to treat the money
borrowed by Harsh Utah Corporation (the Owner Corporation) as money earned by Harsh Investment Corporation (the Sponsor and Building Contractor). Such
a conclusion violates-nay, it ravages- the plain and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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universally .accepted meaning of the terms used. And
re·member, this contract must be construed most strictly
against Schnitzer, its instigator and draftsman.
But, says the Court's opinion, "any profit to be
figured . . . under this contract . . . . must be figured
upon a profit calculated to the owner-sponsor-manager
corporation and not to the construction corporation."
(Opinion, P. 7.) How can this be? The owner corporation
(Harsh Utah) was the rnartager and the borrower, but
was not, and under F. H. A. requirements oould not l~P
the sponsor or the construction corporation. The sponsor
corporation (H:arsh Inve~stmenrt Corporation) was also
the construction corporation, but was not and under
F. H. A. requirements, it could not be the owner or the
borrower. :Moreover, on October 4th, 1951, Harsh Utah,
the owner-manager, was not ye~t in existence, and was
not a party to the contract. With all submission, it is
utterly unreasonable to suppose that these parties on
October 4th, 1951, intended to contract for a bonus based
on money to be borrowed by another corporation not
yet in existence, which borrowed money would have to
be repaid with interest, and part of which 1noney to be
borrowed by the future corporation, they styled "profit
earned by Harsh," the contracting corporation! This
is reductio ad absurdam!
One of the most elen1entary rules of construction
of contracts is that it must be presumed that the parties
intended their .agreement and each clause thereof to have
some legal effect. Therefore the parties must be preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sumed to have contemplated some arrangement by which
Harsh Investment Corpo~ation, the contracting party,
might earn a profit out of which (if large enough), Locke
would be paid a bonus. That much surely must be conceded by all. And yet under the construction adopted
by the Court neither corporation could possibly earn a
profit out of which the bonus could be paid; the contract

is utterly and completely meaningle,ss when so construed,
and could not become operative under any circumstances.
Consider the situation. The opinion says, in effect,
thaJt the agreed compensation to the builder, Harsh
Investment Corporation, under the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" must be disregarded, and, .although
executed, is meaningless and irrevelant to these issues;
the opinion s·ays that the parties did not intend the contract price to

~e

a basis on which construction profits to

this corporation can be computed; the owner need not pay
the contractor the agreed price even though the work is
done. (Opinion, Pp. 6 and 7.) But this is the only possible source of construction revenue or profit to Harsh
Investment. Therefore, H.arsh Investment cannot pos-

sibly earn any profit out of which to pay Locke the bonus
it solemnly agreed to pay him out of construction profits.
In other words, the opinion says the parties agreed and
intended that Locke should be paid a bdnus out of a
profit which the parties knew and intended could not
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and should not be the source of the bonus-a manifestl~·
absurd ,and internally inconsis,tent interpretation, and
one which the parties simply could not have intended.
Consider the other phase of the contract as construed by the Court: The profit contemplated (says
the opinion) was the exces·s of the amount borrowed
by the owner (Harsh U t~ah) over the actual costs of
construction incurred by the sister contrackor corporation
(Harsh Inve·stment). \Vhen stated thus, simply and
baldly, it would seem that this interpretation 1nust fall
of its own weight. IIow could any business man, no
matter how ignorant or gullible, intend so to contract?
Obviously, no profit could ever be realized and no bonus
ever paid under such a contract, (and it must be presumed that they intended something by their contract).
The Court in its computations overlooked in the maze
of figures and evidence a fundamental fact which no
borrower is ever allowed by the lender to forget: Borrowed money must be repaid.
That is what the accountants were talking about
when they testified that 1nortgage proceeds are never
income on which a profit can be based-there is always
that offsetting obligation to repay.
Suppose, for argument, that Schnitzer had proposed
such an agreement to Locke and the latter had sat down
with a pencil to figure his probable bonus under that
"he.ads I win, tails you lose" supposition. His notes
would have come up like this:
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"HARSH UTAI-I CONSTRUCTION PROFIT"
Income:

2,636,800.00
(a) Mortgage Receipts ------$
Less : Repayment of
2,636,800.00
Principal -------------------Net Income from
Mortgage ------------------(b) Mortgage proceeds on
178,672.00
change orders ---------178,672.00
Less: Repayment --------Net Income, Mortgage, based
on change orders -----·
(c) Rental Income --------------Total Net Income ----------

Nothing

Nothing
$ 165,986.49
$ 165,986.49

Expenses:

(a) Direct construction
expense ------------------------------$2,656,457.21
(b) Indirect construction
45,631.34
expense -----------------------------(c) Additional construction
69,5"97 .31
expense -----------------------------Inevitable (and terrific loss) ___ _

$2,771,685.86
-$2,605,699.37

And, if rental income is rejected, the inevitable
construction loss to the owner under this construction
of the contract is always exactly equal to the cost of
construction. No prof:' is possible and hence no bonus
would be possible. rrhis is utterly inconceivable and
manifestly absurd. Locke may be a fool, but Schnitzer
is smart enough to know Locke would not fall for any
such shell game. Neither intended any such inherently
abortive and absurd arrangement.
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What, then, did these parties intend~ They intended
a very simple and business-like arrangement:

First, Locke, having held under their previous agreement a half-interest in both the construction and ownership phases of the three projects, surrendered to Schnitzer his half interest in the ownership ph;ag,e only.
Second, Schnitzer's "finance fee" for financing the
project was incre·ased from the previous 10% of the
amount of the 1nortgage to 10% of the amount of the bids
submitted on the project, an increase in this finance
fee of $13,020.00.
Third, by this time it was known that Harsh Investment was low bidder on three projects mentioned in the
agreement which would cost nine or ten million dollars
to construct, and that the projects would probably be
aw.arded to Harsh (Tr. 324, 87 4-875, 880-881, 34M-40I\I,
199M-200M, 786-788). If Locke was to retire as an owner
from the joint venture, and therefore would not direct
construction as .an owner, who would direet it and in what
capacity? Ce·rtainly not financier Schnitzer. Locke was
the only one in sight, and it was necessary to Schnitzer
that he be tied up to oorry through construction. Therefore Locke was retained as gener:al construction superintendent on all three projects at $1,000 per month.
Locke thus acquired the doubtful privilege of working
his head off and his heart out carrying the responsibility
for what then appeared to be $10,000,000 worth of construction in three widely scattered states. If anyone
ever expected to earn, and did earn his ·wage twice over,
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Locke did. This was no "position"-this was a "job."
Locke earned every penny of his sal,ary by the sweat
of his brow-not by the surrender of his half-interest
in the rentals a£ter the construction period as the Court
intimates in its opinion. It is probable that no other
competent construction n1an would have assumed those
responsibilities for twice the salary, and Locke would
not have done so except that he had a stake in the construction profits which he could protect and enhance by
making sure that the construction was accomplished
with the utmos1t efficiency and econ01ny.

Finally, Locke, having ce:ased to be a co-owner, and
having become an employee of the construction contractor, it was necessary to provide for payment to him of
his retained share of the construction profits after payment of Schnitzer's "finance fee." The simple and
obvious way to do this was to provide that the contractor
pay him, as superintendent, a bonus equal to one-half
of the construction profits after payment of Schnitzer's
finance fee. This was the agreement signed.
Obviously, it was intended then that the sponsor
corporation, Harsh Investment Corporation, would become the prime contractor for the construction of the
projects. The contract (prepared by Schnitzer, not Locke,
may we remind the Court) provided that the bonus
should be paid out of the "profit earned by Harsh in
connection with the construction" as heretofore pointed
out. Moreover, it is further provided that these provisions as to computing the bonus would apply "in the
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event the constnwtion work 1s handled in any other
manner than contracting the entire job on any or all of
said projects as hereinafter set forth." In other words,
it was intended that, with the exception noted, auy construction contract made would be on such terms that
Harsh could 1nake a constt·uction profit, and Locke could
share therein. Schnitzer and his corporation thereunto
plighted their troth, and Locke (who could estin1ate construction costs, but could not foresee that Schnitzer would
shortly become .a confessed perjurer and defrauder)
believed and trusted them.
Schnitzer's then intention to con1pute income and
profit on the basis of the construction contract price
is cle:arly shown by the fact that when work was started
on the first (1tiontana) project, pursuant to the contract,
the books pertaining thereto were set up to reflect income
based on construction contract payments, and only later
did he cause these entries to be changed-apparently for
tax purposes ( T. 459-551; Respondent's original brief,
appendix pp. 1 to 3).
B.2)

The next cogent clue given by the contract itself
as to the true intent of the parties is: Schnitzer and his
attorney chose to promise a bonus out of the Harsh
Investment's earnings "in connection with the construction" of the projects, not in connection with the financing
of the projects. The view adopted by the court's opinion,
that borrowed money was the intended basis of the
earned profit neces'Sarily and obviously can be true only
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if the profit intended was one to be realized out of financing, for the borrowing of money is a. financing, not a.
construction operation. The money borrowed could not
possibly be said to be "earned in connection with the
construction" - the consideration for the loan was the
promise to repay with interest-not the construction of
the houses. On the other hand, the consideration for the
construction of the houses (as specified in all the relevant
exhibits) was the "lump sum" contract price-not the
loan of the 1noney, and conversely, the consider.ation for
payment of the "lump-sum" contract price was the construction of the houses by the contractor - not the
owner's promise to repay. Only the "lump-sum" contract
price can truthfully or logically be said to be "earned in
connection with the construction" as specified in the
contract.
Everything: the October 4th contract itself, the construction contract, the note and mortgage, the VVherry
Housing law and regulations, the testimony of the expert auditors, accepted business practice, the testimony
of Locke, the stipulation and background of the parties,
and the learned trial judge's findings-everything, that
is, except the lying testimony and lying records belatedly
prepared at the direction of the confessed perjurer
Schnitzer-requires that this court affirm the trial court's
finding that the "lump-sum" eontr.act was intended to
be the basis for computing "profits earned in connection
with the construction."
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c.
It is neeessary also to say something about the clause
of the October ±, 1951, agreement to the effect that, if
none of the Schnitzer interests should do the construction
work, and "if Harsh should elect to enter into any agreement with any other finn, person or corporation to perform the entire constntction work on any or all of said
projects on the basis of a guaranteed profit to Harsh"
then Locke should receive certain salary for services required plus 10% of Harsh's "guaranteed profit."
In the Court below, in the original briefs and at the
oral argument this provision was tacitly or expressly
conceded to be inapplicable to the facts as they developed,
and was not explained or argued. Therefore, until this
Court picked it up and used it as a basis for its interpretation of the applicable portion of the agreement no
analysis was deemed necessary in an already extensive
brief. HoweverIn the Court's opinion it is argued that this supports
the conclusion that the partie's, notwithstanding their
clear references to "profits earned," really expected to
pay a bonus out of money borrowed from Irving Trust
Company (which the opinion identifies with the GovernInent) and that they considered they would receive profit
out of the borrowed money. But when this is considered
in the light of customary practices and procedures in
financing and contracting the construction of building
projects of all kinds, it gives no support to any such
strained construction. On the contrary.
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It is such a general practice and custom in financial and building .circles to use the arrangement contemplated that the Court probably, upon refreshing its
judicial recollection, will take judicial notice thereof. If
not, we submit it is the Court's clear duty under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and in the interests of justice
to return the cruse to the trial court for the taking of
further evidence before depriving Locke of his legal
rights and moneys because of a misapprehension arising
for the first time in this Court. As it now stands, we
have no choice but to present in this brief the custom
and procedures contemplated by the clause which
troubled the Court.
What they had in mind was, simply, the very common
practice of a prime contractor subcontracting the entire
job for 'a price less than the original contract price, thus
assuring the prime contractor a guaranteed profit equal
to the difference between the prime contract price and
the sub-contract price. For example, if in this case,
Harsh Investment Corporation, having received from
the owner, Harsh Utah Corporation, the contract to build
the Hill Field Air Force Base Project for $2,995,205,
had immediately sub-contracted the entire job to Vitt
Construction Company, who agreed to build the project
for $2,600,000, this clause would have become operative. Vitt being so obligated by contract backed by a
surety performance bond to do the work for the lesser
figure, Harsh is, in effect, "guaranteed" a profit of
$395,205 on the transaction.
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All the prime 0ontractor, Harsh, would have to do
would be to watch Vitt to 1nake sure it and its surety
perfonned as agreed. For this it would need the services
of .an expert construction man as an "inspector" whose
function would be "to supervise the construction-to
ascertain that said projeets are performed in accordance
with the plans and spec·ifications AGREED TO BY
HARSFI, and Locke shall devote his full time and attention in connection therewith," as provided in this clause
of the contract. This was to have been Locke's role if
Harsh had so sub-contracted the entire job in one piece.
It is too clear f.or argument that unless Harsh subcontracted the construction of the entire project as indicated the p.arties would not be concerned with the quoted
provision. No "guaranteed profit" to Harsh could then
arise in connection with construction.
If the Court will re-read the contract in the light
of this pra0tice understood by the parties, it will be very
clear indeed that all parties intended that the sponsor,
Harsh Investment Corporation, should in any event be
the prime contractor also, and that if Harsh subcontracted the entire job to .an outside-r, Locke would get
a bonus of 10% of the difference (or "guaranteed
profit") while if the project was constructed by IIarsh in
any other manner (i.e., directly, or by "employing"
Schnitzer, or by piecemeal subcontracting), then Locke
would get a bonus equal to 50% of I-Iarsh's net construction profit computed after deduction of the 10%
"finance fee" to be paid Schnitzer for financing the
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inesslike and effective agreement made by the parties
-drawn by Schnitzer, and then approved and signed
by Locke. Under that agreement the basis of the profits
·was, and must have been contemplated as being the
price to be paid H.arsh under the "Construction ContractLump Sum" which the parties shortly thereafter did
in fact oause to be executed between the Owner Corporation ancl Harsh, and which they both knew would have
to be executed under requirements of F. H. A. and the
financing institution.
D

Although the Court's opinion refers to the agreement of October 4th as "clear and unan1biguous," it
finds it necessary to refer to the background .and history
of the parties, their previous dealings and the mistaken
assumption that the agreement was drawn by Locke in
order to arrive at the conclusion that they intended
''money borrowed)) to be '·money earned.)) vVith all due
submission, in the interests of justice it must be said
that the Court's opinion evidences a 1nisunderst.anding
and misconstruction of this background, history and previous dealings as shown by the evidence.
While it is true that at the outset, in June of 1951,
Locke alone was familiar with Wherry Housing procedures and requirements, by October 4th, Schnitzer
had applied his very superior, if amoral, intelligence
to the problem, had studied, .and was thoroughly familiar
with the entire set up. He had worked with Locke in
preparing and submitting bids on several projects, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
knew from beginning to end all of the requiren1enb.;
and all of the possible alte~rnative procedure'S, as is
well evidenced by the alternative provisions of the cont:vact, which he testified he himself drafted before it
was polished by his cousin-attorney.
Moreover, he had, even prior to the agreement of
August 29, 1951, hired the Portland attorney W~alter
E. Hutchinson, who was an expert in, and limited his
practice exclusively to the legal aspects of Wherry
Housing projects. He aided Schnitzer and Locke setting
up the entire program; he computed the amount of the
compensation fixed in the lump-sum construction contract and prepared the contract itself as the attorney
for Schnitzer's interests; and was Schnitzer's advisor
and man thenceforth, even to the extent that he, a lawyer,
admittedly committed perjury in the course of the trial
at Schnitzer's behest (T. 810-812).
Hutchinson, Schnitzer's man, knew, and before October 4, 1951, Schnitzer knew, (1) that I-Iarsh Investment
Corpor.ation, the Sponsor, could not, under F. H. A.
requirements w0t also as Owner, and a sepa!'late Owner
corporation would have to be organized under Utah
law (Administrative Rules and Regulations for Military
Housing Insurance under Title VIII of the National
Housing Act, Sections IV, 4.(a) and V, 4); (2) that the
Owner corporation would, under F. H. A. and lender's
requirement, have to enter into a "lump-sum" construction contract for the projects with a legally sep·arate
corporation bonded by surety company to complete the
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projeds for the stipulated price which was required to
be paid to the contractor, as Hutchinson testified (T.
333-344; 829-832; 335-337; 1115-1116); (3) that while
a limited profit might be earned by the construction
contr.actor-whether speculative or guaranteed by subcontract-the principal profit which the facts and the
Wherry Housing Act praetieally guaranteed was to
be derived from rentals over a 75 year tenn, which were
income-tax free for the first 33 years; ( ±) that the money
borrmrcd from Irving Trust Co. for construction would
have to be repaid or these rental profits would be lost
by mortgage foreclosure; (5) that Schnitzer, as a millionaire, would tax-wise get least out of earned profit, and
profit most out of tax free, long term rental income,
while Locke's earned income would fall in a lower tax
bracket and he needed quick profits for a s·take for his
future; (6) that F. H. A. required the Owner-1\t!ortgagor
(not the Sponsor or the Contractor) to secure completion
of the project by depositing in escrow c.ash or U.S.
securities equal to 10o/o of the estimated project replacement cost (the owner's required "10% equity"), which
funds F. H. A. and Irving Trust Co. required to be
expended for work and material on the physical improvements prior to the advance of any mortgage money
(Exhibit 228, "Invitation," paragraphs 7 and 8; Regulations, Section Y 2; T. 1117-1121); (7) that H.arsh
Investment Corporation, the Sponsor, would also be
the prime construction contractor to e~arn what construction profits were available in the projects, which
had b~en estimated and bid (see the Contract as analyzed,
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supra, and subsequent behavior of the parties thereunder
before Schnitzer's greed evoked his larcenous tendencies
against his erstwhile friend and collaborator, Locke); (8)
that Locke, under the August 29th agreement, then owned
a half interest in both the construction and ownershiprental phases of all three projects bid (August 29th
agreement, quoted in opinion); and (9) finally, that
Locke's construction know-how and experience were
essential to Schnitzer in the building of the projects
(Court Opinion, recognizing that Schnitzer had limited
construction knowledge).
All these facts and the knowledge of both parties
thereof either appear clearly from the evidence received
by the trial court, or the trial court was entitled to infer
and find from evidence received. The careful, c;onscientious, le.arned and experienced trial court obviously
did so, for it construed the contract and found the intention of the parties in accord with the obvious requirenlents thereof, and as Locke has always contended.
It is the law that where the trial court has entered
a judgment, this Court will presume every finding and
inference of fact necessary to support the judgment
which the record will in any way support, even though
such finding is not specifically made and entered by the
trial court, and findings will be implied or supplied if
neeessary.
5 C. J. 8. "Appeal and Error" Seetion 1564h, pp.
418 et seq.;

Ibid. section 1566 ;
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Baird v. Upper Canal Irr. Co., 70 Utah 57, 257
Pac. 1060 (Syll. 14)
Thus, while it is true, as the Court's opinion states,
that the law is that "an integrated contract cannot be
varied by parol evidence" (emphasis added), we are not
dealing here with an integrated contract specifying that
Locke shall be paid a bonus out of "excess money
borrowed by the Owner in connection with the construction;" we are dealing with a contract specifying that
Locke shall be paid a bonus out of "profits earned by
Harsh in connection with the construction." As the
Contract does not speeify the formula for computing
the "profit earned by Harsh," the trial court very properly received evidence and made its findings on the intention of the parties in order to fill in this hiatus. The
Court's findings and judgment .are amply supported
in the record, and hence with all due submission, should
not have been upset here. See the authorities cited on
pages 100-101 of Respondent's original brief herein.

And if this Contract is to be regarded as an integrated contract, not to be varied by parol evidence, the
judgment of the Court below is eminently correct on
this point, and should be affirmed as giving effect to
the Contr.act as written, by computing "profits earned
by Harsh in connection with the construction" in accord
with the accepted usual and ordinary meaning of these
words m their everyday usage by ordinary business
men.
With all due submission, to construe the words
"profits earned by Harsh" (which, under law, could not
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be the Owner) as meaning "Excess rnoney vorrozced anu
to be repaid by the Owner," .as is done in the opinion
herein, is for the Court cornpletely to re-write the Contract made by the parties, so that it becomes completely
meaningless and impossible to execute, as has been herein demonstrated. This "re-write job" also does grave
injustice to Locke, whose actions, honor and integrity
are uni1npeached on this record outside of the testimony
of the admitted perjurer and defr.auder Schnitzer.

We think the Court should be reminded, in the
interests of common justice, that Locke was no "deepreacher." He was a man with an idea for the earning
of an honest profit in a lawful way, and who was unfortunate enough to fall in with a well-heeled thief (to use
the applicable, plain term) and not to discover Schnitzer's
true character until it was too late. This could happen
to anyone, and should not be used by the Court to stigmatize Locke's name on the public record or to deprive
him of the rightful proceeds of his idea, skill and toil.
In this connection we think our duty requires that
we remind the Court that it was largely on the basis
of Loeke's testimony that the lower Court was able to
circumvent Schnitzer's schemes to defraud the subcontractors Moulding, Waterfall, et al, out of their
compensation, and to enter judgments in their favor in
excess of $246,378.58. Locke did this even though it
was then apparent that every dollar ordered paid to a
sub-contractor cost Locke personally the sum of fifty
cents. His testimony for the sub-contractors cost him
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$123,000.00 in round figures. Is this the act of a "deepreacher"-the act of a co-conspirator to defraud both
the Government and the Utah sub-contr.a.ctors ~ The
answer is obvious : No ! It is the act of an honest man
and fellow victim who had walked unknowingly into
Schnitzer's snares-a man entitled to justice.
In its opinion the Court comn1ents that the prospect
of rental profits from the project were "remote, speculative, and highly uncertain," and intimates that in
October of 1951 Locke was and should have been happy,
even anxious, to surrender a half interest therein in
return for a $1000 per month salary during the construction period. In assuming this position the Court
overlooks several most important facts be.aring on
Locke's attitude and the intention of the parties. In
the first place it then appeared that Locke, for this
salary, would have to direct and have full direct re,sponsibility for the construction of 3 widely separ.ated and
difficult rush projects costing nine or ten million dollars
to build, while reporting to and coordinating with
Schnitzer at the headquarters in Portland, Oregon. He
was going to earn that salary, or even double that
amount, with labor, sweat and tears, and both parties
knew it. He didn't have to "buy" the salary twice, and
Schnitzer had to hai'C a co11.'-druction superinte11drnt.
In the second place, in October, 1951 the rentals looked
like the surest investment as well as the tax-free phase
of the profit, whi0h would continue over a lifetime.
The Government had certified, and the p.arties knew,
that there was a critical shortage of housing in the areas
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involved. From Wherry Housing procedures and rules
and the terms of the "Invitation" to bid on the project
(Exhibit 228, paragraph 6) they knew that rentals
would be fixed so as to bring 6¥2% per annum on the
difference between the mortgage and the estin1ated rrplacement cost on a 93o/o occupancy factor, (a chart of
which is set forth hereafter), with rentals to be adjusted
upward to bring the s~ame return if the occupancy factor
fell below 93%. Previously constructed Wherry projects
were (and continue to be) phenominally successful.
Schnitzer was only required to put up certain escrow
funds, while Locke was not required to put up any money,
and the remaining 90% could be borrowed with an
F. H. A. guaranty .at an annual intererst which could
not exceed 4% per annum. So, as it appeared to these
joint venturers in 1951, Locke, for his idea and services
in preparing bids, and making e·stimates, etc., owned
a half int erest in probable construction profits and in
the .apparently "brass-bound cinch" tax-free rental profits
over a lifetime~a life pension.
1

Actually, as shown by Exhibit 4.43, tendered by defendants, the ultimately approved replacen1ent cost

of

the Hill Field project alone, was $3,547,860.00, while

the mortgage was $2, 791,200.00, leaving an Owner's equity
at the outset of $756,660.00.
For the purpose of illustration of what was con'

.

templated, we have set out in Appendix I a computation
of tax-free rental incmne

fran~

the Hill Field project
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alone, prepared on the basis of these figures and Government regulations for the first 10-year period.
From that computation it is apparent that Locke
(an optimistic builder) very probably considered he had
prior to October -t, 1951, a half interest in probable construction profits of more than $181,000 (the bid had been
raised after the computation shown in Exhibit 222, appellant's brief, Appendix 36) plus tax-free rental profit
for the first 10 of 75 years amounting to $375,985 as a
minimum, less Schnitzer's finance fee - .and all this in
return for that great basis of American business: a sound
idea with know-how, all without having to risk a dime of
capital. And this is only one of three projects which
would go on for 75 years!
It is thus apparent that Locke (an optimistic builder)
considered he had prior to October 4, 1951, a half interest
in probable construction profits of more than $181,000
(the bid had been raised after the computation shown
in Exhibit 22, appelant's brief, Appendix 36) plus taxfree rental profit for the first 10 of 75 years amounting
to $375,985 as a minimum, less Schnitzer's finance fe:e
-and all this in return for that great basis of American
business: .a sound idea with know-how, and without
having to risk a dime of capital. And this is only one of
three projects which would go on for 75 years!

"\Ve respectfully submit to the Court that it is inconceivable that Locke intended to exchange this project
for a tough, hard construction job, at bare wages for an
experienced General Construction 'Superintendent and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

Builder, especially when such men were being offered
employment anywhere at premium prices at the time, as
the Court judicially knows. Indeed, such skills still
demand a premium.
It is equally inconceiv:able that Schnitzer, in drafting
the new contract could have thought he could get Locke
to give up this kind of a prospect for a mere job plus the
absolutely impossible prospeet o.f a bonus to be paid out
of the profits of borrowed money, all of which had to be
repaid under the law. Never did Locke appear that
gullible. No, as the Contract says, the parties intended
Locke to get a bonus out of "profits earned by Harsh"
in the performance of a constru0tion contract for the
contemplated and required Owner corporation, which
could only be based on the lump-sum contract price.
I-Iarsh had, and could expect no income from any other
source.
\Vhen the parties met in 1951, Schnitzer, although
still in his twenties, was already a millionaire. This is
not accomplished without a sharp nose for a good business proposition, and it is obvious that in Wherry Housing he instantly recognized one. That he was not mistaken is well proven by the history of such projects generally, and particularly by the section on Wherry Housing contained in Report No. 1890 of the 84th Congress,
2nd Session, House of Representatives, entitled "Authorizing Construction; Construction for the IJ!ilitary
Departments." An excerpt therefr01n is printed 1n Appendix II hereof. It is there shown that the average
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Wherry Unit cost less than $9000 to build, arrd will bring
.an annual rental of $1080, or $81,000 over the term of a
75 year lease. This of course was based on 100% occupancy, whereas the projects were designed to return
61j2 o/o of cost ·on 93% occupancy. The Hill Field rentals
over the term will gross $23,898,000 based on 93% occupancy, or $25,575,000 based on 100% occupancy. And
these rentals will be paid out of housing allowances to
Government military personnel.
No wonder the Committee recommended that the
Government acquire these projects for the replacement
cost, in this case, $3,547,860.
Since then, in the National Housing Act of 1956, Section 512, printed in Appendix III hereof, the Congress
has authorized the purchase of such projects for the estimated replacement cost less depreciation (which, by regulation, is on a 50 year base, or 2% per annum). The
project was not certified as complete until January, 1955,
so, as the mortgage amortizes (over 331j3 years,) more
rapidly than the property depreciates, Schnitzer's equity
should be worth more now in cash than the $756,660 it
was worth at completion. And at cmnpletion Schnitzer
had already withdrawn more than he had advanced on
the project: he didn't, and doesn't, have a penny of his

own invested.
That's not so had, on another man's idea and knowhow! Schnitzer will still have a tremendous profit, even
if he is required to pay Locke what he owes him. It's not
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so inconceivable that he should agree to pay Locke a
bonus for such an idea plus know-how.
The Court also conunents in effect that the parties
could not have intended to base a bonus on .an unascertained and highly arbitrary amount of a contract between
two wholly owned Schnitzer corporations, which he could
have set at a figure so low as to insure no profit at all.
The answer to this is twofold. First, Locke had not then
discovered Schnitzer's true character, and obviously
trusted and was entitled to trust hi1n to do the right,
proper and fair thing as conte1nplated. Second and more
important, perhaps, both had been working with the expert Hutchinson, and both knew that if the contract price
was set unreasonably low Harsh could not get a performance bond as required by law and regulation, and Schnitzer, who was already having difficulty (according to his
statements to Locke) in raising the money for the
"additional cash requirements over the mortgage owner's
equity," would have to raise and escrow substantial
additional funds .to insure the completion of the contract,
as I-Iutchinson testified before the trial court. This gave
assurance that the contract price (which Hutchinson
computed from F. H. A. considerations .and requirements) would be as contemplated, and on th81t basis
Locke knew he could oause Harsh to do the work ~at a.
profit which would assure him a substantial bonus. See
the Regulations, Section V 5, and Hutchinson's testimony
before the trial Court (T. 339-342; 829-833) as set out
in Respondent's original brief, Appendix, pp. 4 to 7 .and
16 to 21.
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In the light of this situation it is inconceivable that
Locke, in signing an agre·ement for a bonus to be paid
out of "profit e~arned by Harsh" renlly intended his bonus
to come, as the Court suggests, from "surplus moneys
borrowed by the owner," which would have to be repaid
to the lender before Schnitzer could get any tax-free
rental profits. It is equally inconceivable that Schnitzer
really intended any such result or contract; and again,
Schnitzer's contract must be construed most strictly
aqainst him.
The intention attributed to the parties by the Court
necessarily presupposes and presumes a presently formed
conspiracy between the parties to defr.aud the lender,
Irving Tiust Co., and the Government out of the money
to be borrowed with no intention of ever repaying the
same, and there is no evidence whatsoe!ver to support
such a finding, especially as to Locke. :Moreover, the
law of Utah, and elsewhere, is that fraud is never presumed, but must be proved in every case by clear and
convincing evidence.

Lane V. Peterson, 68 rtah 585, 251 Pac. 374;
Rawson v. Handy, 88 Utah 131; 408 Pac. 2nd,
473, -l-79.
Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., 87 Utah 15, 47
P.ac. 2nd 524;
37 C. J. 8. "Fraud" section 94;
Ibid, section 114.
On the contrary, a lawful, proper and effective intention and contract n1ust, under familiar rules, be preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sumed and applied in the absence, as here, of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary.
The Court also says that it is inconceivable that
Schnitzer intended Locke to be paid a bonus out of intercompany profits computed from income paid in part out
of his own contributed equity funds. Why~ Employers
frequently pay bonuses to employees with good and
profitable ideas. Besides, Locke would get as bonus only
what he already owned as co-venturer under the August
29th agreement, and Schnitzer the millionaire, would
acquire Locke's former half interest in the expected taxfree rentals-a great inducement.
Surely this is both conceivable and logi0al, and
Schnitzer had to leave in his 10o/o equity .anyway, under
the law. It went out first in contract payments under the
regulations.
Finally, the Court assumes and states that the
August 29th agreement contemplated profits out of
borrowed money-"moneys received from the Government for such construction"~and argues therefrom that
the parties therefore intended the s.ame basis for pr.ofit
in the October 4th contract. The premise is false. If the
Court will re-read the August 29th agreement, it will
be very clear that all it does in this regard is to guarantee
Schnitzer a profit "off the top" which is "equal'' to 10%
of monies received from the Government. A guarantee
of a profit "equal" to 10% of the mortgage (if that is
what was intended, as no money ever was intended to be
actually received "from the government") is quite a
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different thing frmn profits ureceived O'ltt of" monies
from the Government.
The Court erred in holding that borrowed mortgage
money was intended to be the income basis of "profit
earned by Harsh." It should, in common justice correct
that error.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NET RENTAL
INCOME DURING THE CONSTRUCTION PERIOD IS NOT
TO BE INCLUDED AS REVENUE IN COMPUTING PROFITS
EARNED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE PROJECT;

Although this Court, in setting forth what it considered to be the proper formula for computing Locke's
bonus, in its decision did include as a part of income the
net rental receipts during the construction period of
$165,986.49, the Court further stated "nor can we agree
with the trial court that Locke was entitled to share in
any rentals."
It is submitted that the trial court in its findings of
fact did properly include as construction income in determining the profits to be divided between the parties,
the amount of $165,986.49 received as rentals during
the construction period. This is supported unequivocally
by the testimony and re·cords presented to the trial court.

Although it is admittedly true that under the terms
of the October 4th agreement Locke had no interest in or
to the ownership or management of the projects, it is also
true that Locke's interest by the terms and conditions

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
9

of said agreen1ent was "limited to the construction of said
projects or any of the1n as in the manner hereinabove
set forth." A distinction was properly made by the trial
court as to the construction period involved in its interpretation of the October 4th agreement. The construction period pertaining to the Hill Field Air Force Base
project was a period of 24 months, beginning on July 21st
of 1952 and terminating in July of 1954. This was substantiated by the testimony of Harold J. Schnitzer (T.
119-120). It w.as further substantiated by the terms and
conditions of the "lump sum" construction contract (Exhibit 61) which allowed a period of 24 months to build
said project. The com1nitment for mortgage insurance
(Exhibit 186) likewise establishes this 24-month period
by determining when the amortiz,ation of the mortgage
itself shall commence at ~a time 24 months after the construction is to start. The mortgage executed by Harsh
Utah Corporation (Exhibit 63) and the Building & Loan
Agreement (Exhibit 64) again clearly set forth the 24month period.
The above mentioned documents and other evidence
contained in the record before the trial court clearly
establish that Locke's interest in the construction of this
projeet continued for the full construction period of 24
months. According to the above set forth documents the
owner-manager, Harsh Utah Corporation, was not required to amortize or make payments on the mortgage
until the end of the said 24-month period, and as a
matter of actual fact, IIarsh Utah Corporation did not
fully take over owner-manager responsibility nor was
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the project finally accepted by the United States Government and a final mortgage executed by Harsh Utah Corporation as mortgagor until January of 1955.
Hespondent Locke testified that there was an agreement between himself and Appellant Schnitzer to the
effect that income from rentals during the above mentioned 24-month period of construction would be included
in computing Locke's interest under the contract of
October -±, 1951 (T. 42-.M-~-5-l\I, 797). It is certainly not
reasonable to believe or to conceive that Locke as General Com;truction Superintendent would have expended
large sums of money for overtime on these projects without the compensating factor of rental income in mind. By
this subsequent agreement the Contract of October 4th
U'as modified to the extent of the constnwtion period
rentals.
During the course of the trial documentary exhibits
were introduced to support the fact that Harold J.
Schnitzer himself cle~arly intended that rental incmne
should be used to defray construction expenses. This
Court's attention is directed to the letters, Exhibits 181,
184, 185, 213, 231, 233 and 238. When read and understood,
and read against the background of the relationship between the various corporations, (to wit; Harsh Montana
as owner in ~fontana, Harsh Construction Co. as the contractor in :Montana; Harsh Utah as the owner in Utah
and Harsh Investment Corporation as the contractor in
Ptah; and Harsh California, the owner in California,
and Harsh Construction Co. again the contracting organiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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z.ation in California) and considered in the light of the
testimony of Mr. Schnitzer as to the relationships being
identical between these various corporations (T. 119,
120), these lette-rs most clearly and definitely sustain the
trial Court'·s Findings of Fact pertaining to this rental
income.
Ex. 185 is a letter from Harsh Utah Corporation
signed by Mr. Schnitzer which says, in part, "Lack of
rental income from completed units, which income was
anticipated by sponsor to defray construction costs on
the original bid" is clear and convincing evidence as to
the intent of Mr. S.chnitzer, although some of the oral
testimony on his behalf may have been to the contrary.
The evidence before the trial Court, taken in its
entirety, from various places in the transcript and from
documentary evidence submitted, clearly established a
construction period pertaining to the Hill Field Air
Force Base Housing Project of 24 months and it was this
construction period in which Mr. Locke had a direct
interest under the terms .and conditions of the October
4th, 1951 agreement. The documentary evidence hereinabove quoted and set forth clearly shows that it was the
intent of Schnitzer to defray construction costs by rental
receipts. The evidence further clearly shows that Harsh
Utah Corporation could not assu1ne its role as ownermanager of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project until such time as it had been completely constructed
and had been accepted by the Federal Housing Administration and the United States Air Force.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted, that there is
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clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence to support
the trial Court's Finding that rental income in the amount
of $165,986.49 during said construction period should
be properly used in the computation of profits in which
Locke should participate and there is no evidence and/or
logical argument upon which this Court can base a proper
reversal of the trial Court's decision in this regard.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER POINT
I OF RESPONDENT'S CROSS APPEAL AND IN FAILING
TO HOLD THAT THE AMOUNT OF REVENUE FOR THE
CHANGE ORDER EXTRAS WAS $333,952.55 INSTEAD OF
$178,672.00.

It appears from a careful reading of the decision
of this Court, that, other than to note that the trial
Court rejected plaintiff's contention as to change orders
and allowed further income only to the extent that the
change orders resulted in an increase in the mortgage
amount rather than the mnount of the contracts for
change orders between Harsh Investment Corporation
and Harsh Ftah Corporation, this Court did not concern itself with the matters presented by Point I of
Respondent's brief on cross appeal.

Respondent submits that the 1 ssue presented by
Point I of his original brief was presented earnestly
and in good faith, and that he is entitled to a fair consideration thereof and ruling thereon by this court under
the provisions of the Utah Constitution, Article VIII,
Section 25.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

44

Respondent respectfully requests and urges the members of this Court to examine carefully the terminology
of Exs. 164 and 196 which are the change orders themselves. Re'spondent subn1its that these documents are a
contract between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh
Investment Corporation and which, under the terms rmd
conditions of the plans and specifications which was
made a part of the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum"
that the only conclusion that can be lawfully or logically
be drawn is the consideration that Harsh Investment
Corporation as the contractor is entitled to receive on
said change orders the contract price of $333,952.55.
The facts and law applicable to this issue are quite
fully argued under Point I of Respondent's brief on
cross-appeal (original brief, pp. 80 to 87). The argument under Point I of this brief is also relevant.
Respondent the.refore will not repeat these facts
and arguments, but respectfully requests and urges this
Court to rule on this issue in accord with the law and
the facts as sub1nitted in Respondent's briefs.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER POINT
II OF RESPONDENT'S ·CROSS APPEAL AND IN FAILING
TO HOLD THAT APPELLANTS MAY NOT RECEIVE OUT
OF CONSTRUCTION PROFITS TEN PERCENT (10%) OF
THE AMOUNT OF THE BID BEFORE COMPUTING RESPONDENT'S BONUS.

Respondent again submits, after carefully reading
this Court's decision, that it is apparent that this Court
did not consider nor did it determine a very material
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issue in this matter, as to whether or not, under the
terms and conditions of the October 4th, 1951 .agreement,
Harsh was entitled to retain ten percent (10%) of the
total amount of the bid before computing the bonus to
which Locke was entitled.
Appellants attempt to establish that Schnitzer adequately financed the project by a continual process of
transferring funds from one corporation to another and
from one project to another as the occasion may require
or demand. This theory of .appellants is absolutely contrary to the rules and regulations of the Federal I-Iousing
Administration; it is absolutely contrary to the terms and
conditions of the mortgage and the building and loan
agreement. It is inconceivable that appellants would
attempt to assert that it was proper in any manner to
transfer funds from one project to another. A careful
analysis by this Court of the facts will lead to only one
conclusion in this matter. In _Montana, Harsh ~fontana
borrowed funds from :Manufacturers Trust Company
with which to assist in the construction of the Montana
project. In l~ tah, Harsh Utah borrowed from the Irving
Trust Company funds with which to assist in the construction of this project, and any manipulation of these
TRPST funds between projects in any manner whatsoever would have been in violation of the terms and conditions of the individual mortgages, the commitment for
mortgage insu:;_·ance and the building and loan agreement
as well as the F. H. A. rules and regulations.
Any contention that Locke had knowledge of these
transfers during the construction of the various projects
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is not supported by any evidence or the record before the
trial Court. Locke was the construction superintendent,
busily engaged in building projects in the states of
Montana and Utah and did not concern himseH with the
financial manipulations earried on by Schnitzer during
the course of construction of the projects.
Appellants would urge in their reply brief that
Ex. 195 as submitted on behalf of appellants was never
controverted or attacked and attempt to set this up as an
accounting for funds on Hill Field Air Force Base. The
testimony of Mr. Ellis, the accountant for the various
Harsh companies, clearly shows that this is not true and
that the sum of $1,040,505.00 was expended by Harsh
Investment Corporation during the construction of the
Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project on activities
of various Schnitzer corporations other than the Hill
Field Project (T. 475). As a result, the owner never
has paid the contractor the lump-su1n contract price, or
the amounts due it under the "change order" contra,cts.
As has been demonstrated, it was from these payments to the contractor that the construction profit and
Locke's bonus is to be computed and paid. As the trial
court found, Sehnitzer did not perform his obligation to
finance the project, and hence has never earned his
"finance fee."
Respondent did not, prior to this Court's decision,
file a reply to the "Reply Brief of Appellants," although
the reply brief of said appellants contains many arguments and statements which cannot in any manner whatSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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soever be supported
Respondent asSIUIIled
would disregard the
were not supported
court.

by the evidence and the record.
and still assumes that this Cour.t
arguments therein contained that
by the evidence before the trial

Respondent will not reiterate his theory and argument on this point, which are presented on pages 87 to
109 of his original brief. However, Respondent does
respectfully request and again urges this Court carefully
to consider and rule upon the argument and issue there
submitted.
Respondent is confident, and respectfully submits
that such careful consideration will result in a ruling in
Respondent's favor on this issue.
CONCLUSION
As stated at the outset, each member of this Court
is entitled to and has our sympathy when he is confronted
with the task of sifting the truth out of this voluminous
record, encumbered as it is with the lies, the evasions,
the half-truths, and the plausible inventions of the intellectual perjurer Schnitzer-but the duty, in the service
o.f justice, is inescapable and non-delegable.
The Appellant's late-filed reply brief (which so
peculiarly and markedly differs in style and presentation from his original brief) seems to have influenced
greatly the Court's opinion. It is earnestly submitted,
however, that most, if not all, of the assertions which
found their way from this brief into the Court's opinion
are erroneous and contrary to the trial court's proper
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findings and the evidence. An example is the characterization of anticipated rental profits as "entirely fictitious,
speculative and uncertain" - and yet, as the court also
observes, neither party "planned on losing any money"!
And in fact those profits were reasonably expected io net
millions over the years, as shown above in the sample
tabulation of tax-free rental profits. And this is only
one san1ple of many. The Court's mistaken statement
that Locke's attorney drafted the key agreement is another and terribly important one.
The Court has been misled by Schnitzer's plausible
inventions, and, it is very respectfully submitted, the
members of the Court have a duty now to check every
fact and concept against the record and to correct its
misapprehensions-an admittedly difficult but not impossible task.
Respondent is confident that when this is done the
Court will withdraw its present opinion and decision,
mod.ify the judgment as prayed in Respondent's crossappeal, and affirn1 the lower court's judgment as so
modified.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN M. SHERMAN
212 California Bank Building
Pasadena, California
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
1018 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent,
Alvin T. Locke
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APPENDIX I
Illustrativ.e Computation of Expected Rental Profits:
First 10 Years
1.
ANNUAL
INCOME

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

2.
3.
ANNUAL
ANNUAL
OPERATING &
RESERVE
MAINTENANCE
FOR
EXPENSE
REPLACEMENT

4.
ANNUAL
TAXES

$81,362
81,362
81,362
81,362
81,362
81,362
81,362
81,362
81,362
....
81,362

$30,612
30,612
30,612
30,612
30,612
30,612
30,612
30,612
30,612
30,612

7.
NET ANNUAL
PROFIT AT
100%
OCCUPANCY

5.
ANNUAL
DEBT
SERVICE
INCLUDING
PAYMENT OF
PRINCIPAL &
INTEREST

6.
NET ANNUAL
PROFIT AT
93%
OCCUPANCY
(Guaranteed)

$167,430
164,083
160,736
157,389
154,042
150,695
147,348
144,001
140,654
137,307

$ 22,537
25,884
29,231
32,578
35,925
39,272
42,619
45,966
49,313
52,660

$ 46,522
49,869
53,216
56,563
59,910
63,25'2
66,604
69,951
73,298
76,645

TOTAL MINIMUM NET, TAX-FREE INCOME FOR TEN YEARS ____ $375,985

$615,830

yr.
yrs.
yrs.
yrs.
yrs.
yrs.
yrs.
yrs.
ym.
yrs.

$318,651
318,651
318,651
318,651
318,651
318,651
318,651
318,651
318,651
318,651

$16,710
16,710
16,710
16,710
16,710
16,710
16,710
16,710
16,710
16,710

(,)

(*) At 100% occupancy the income in Column 1 would be increased by the difference that Column 7

exceeds ·Column 6. (Izakson's testimony at time of trial was that Hill Field Air Force Base
Housing Project was 100% occupied.)
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APPENDIX II
Excerpt from Report No. 1890, 84th Cong-ress, 2nd Session,
House of Representatives
"TITLE VIII (Wherry Housing)
"The history of the so-called Wherry housing
program is well-known and needs no repeHtion
here. It was embarked upon when it appeared
that it provided the only feasible method for providing mu0h-needed family housing for our military personnel. It served a useful purpose. In
the committee's opin1on, however, the time has
come when this unusually expensive program
must be reviewed and action taken which will
eliminate costs which are wholly unnecessary.
"With the foregoing thoughts in mind, the
committee inserted a new section 419 which would
pernrit the purchase by the Government of
Wherry housing projects. The savings to be effected are so large that it would be an unreasonable man indeed who would deny the wisdom of
embarking upon this program of purchase. Briefly stated, a Wherry owner or sponsor holds a
le:ase for 50 or 75 years from the Government
which gives him the right to future income for the
period of his lease. When one considers tha;t thP
housing unit involved cost less than $9,000 to construct, and that the average housing allowance is
$90 a month or $1,080 a year, it is clear that the
Government will spend exorbitant sums prior to
the time that it will have possession of the house.
For exmnple, the Congress will be appropriating
housing allowance at the average rate of $l.ORO
per year per unit for either 50 or 75 years. For
those leases which cover 50 years, the cost to the
Government for the $9,000 unit will be $54,000.
ii
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The cost to the Goverrunent for the 75-year lease
unit will be $81,000. There are ·today approximately 82,000 \Yherry units. One needs but to
multiply 82,000 times $54,000 to conclude that
prompt and aggressive action of the kind contemplated by this section must be taken."
APPENDIX III
Section 512, National Housing Act of 1956

"ACQUISITION OlT WHERRY ACT HOUSING
"SEC. 512. Section 404 of the Housing
Amendments of 1955 is amended to read as follows:
'SEC. 404 (a). vVhenever the Secretary of
Defense or his designee deems it necessary for
the purpose of this title, he may acquire by purchase, donation, condemnation, or nther means
of transfer, any land or (with the approval of the
Federal Housing Commissioner) any housing financed with mortgages insured under the provisions of title VIII of the National Housing Act
as in effect prior to the enactment of the I-Iousing
Amendments of 1955. The purchase price of any
such housing shall not exceed the Federal Housing
Commissioner's estimate of the replacement cost
of su.ch housing and related property (not including the value of any improvements installed
or constructed with appropriated funds) as of the
date of final endorsement for mortgage insurance
redtttced by an appropriate allowance for physical
depreciation as determined by the Secretary of
Defense or his designee upon the advice of the
Commissioner: Provided, That in .any cas·e where
the Secretary or his designee acquires a projeCJt
held by the Commissioner, the price paid shall not
exceed the face value of the ilebentnre~ (plus aecrued interest thereon) which the Commissioner
issued in acquiring such project.'"
iii
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